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Abstract—With the increasing interest in the use of millimeter
wave bands for 5G cellular systems comes renewed interest in
resource sharing. Properties of millimeter wave bands such as
massive bandwidth, highly directional antennas, high penetration
loss, and susceptibility to shadowing, suggest technical advantages
to spectrum and infrastructure sharing in millimeter wave cellu-
lar networks. However, technical advantages do not necessarily
translate to increased profit for service providers, or increased
consumer surplus. In this paper, detailed network simulations are
used to better understand the economic implications of resource
sharing in a vertically differentiated duopoly market for cellular
service. The results suggest that resource sharing is less often
profitable for millimeter wave service providers compared to
microwave cellular service providers, and does not necessarily
increase consumer surplus.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the introduction of millimeter wave (mmWave) cellular
systems as a candidate for the next generation of mobile
networks, there has been renewed interest in problems related
to sharing resources, i.e. spectrum and base stations (BSs).
Early results suggest that compared to conventional microwave
frequencies, the massive bandwidth, increased spatial degrees of
freedom, and greater path loss increase the technical benefits
of resource sharing in mmWave frequencies [1]–[4]. Some
have suggested that these technical gains will translate to
economic gains. For example, [1] claims that it is economical
for mmWave service providers to share resources because
they can offer the same quality of service while licensing
less spectrum. Similarly, [4] considers a scenario where a
primary mmWave spectrum holder can earn additional revenue
by licensing the spectrum in a secondary market with the
condition of restricted interference to its own users. However,
even if service providers can reduce licensing costs or earn
revenue from secondary licensing while keeping quality of
service the same, resource sharing can affect profits if it shifts
demand to a competing service provider, or if it changes the
market dynamics in a way that forces down the price. None
of [1]–[4] consider the effects of demand and competition.
Some of the literature in both engineering and economics dis-
ciplines addresses economic and regulatory aspects of resource
sharing in conventional cellular networks [5]–[9]. However,
the fundamental technical differences between mmWave and
microwave frequencies also affect the markets for these services.
For example, an early economic perspective on mmWave
networks [10] suggests that their limited coverage range is
a key challenge for their cost efficiency. Similarly, our previous
work [11] shows that the dynamics of demand and ease of
market entry, and the effect of unlicensed spectrum or open
association small cells on these, are different in mmWave
networks (compared to microwave small cell networks). Thus,
we posit that the economic impact of resource sharing may
also be different. To gain a fuller understanding of the benefits
of resource sharing in mmWave networks, we need to identify
the specific impact on quality of service, and then understand
how this affects the demand, price, and cost of service.
The goal of this work, therefore, is to understand the strategic
decisions of wireless service providers with respect to resource
sharing in mmWave 5G cellular networks. We apply the
economic model of compatibility of network goods [12], [13]
to resource sharing in mmWave cellular networks. We describe
a duopoly game involving two vertically differentiated cellular
service providers, and compare mmWave and microwave
networks with respect to service provider profits, market
coverage, consumer surplus, and price of service with and
without resource sharing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin with
a brief introduction to the economic framework used in this
paper, in Section II. In Section III, we describe the wireless
system model, and show simulation results in Section IV.
In Section V, we describe a duopoly game involving two
vertically differentiated network service providers, and compare
the benefits of resource sharing decisions to consumers and
service providers in mmWave and microwave networks. Finally,
in Section VI, we conclude with a discussion of the implications
of this work and areas of further research.
II. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
In this paper, we use an economic model that includes
several important considerations for resource sharing in cellular
networks:
• Network effect. This captures the effect of a large network
service provider (NSP) with more subscribers typically
having more base stations and spectrum than a competitor
with a smaller market share.
• Compatibility. This models the decision of an NSP
to share resources (base stations and spectrum) and
potentially increase the value of its service to subscribers,
or to preserve its own market power by not sharing
resources.
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• Vertical differentiation. This models the ability of an
NSP to distinguish itself from competitors in aspects of
its service other than network size and price.
The network size and the extent of the network effect, as well
as the compatibility (resource sharing) decision, determine the
consumer’s expected data rate, and the vertical differentiation
captures other factors affecting consumers’ decisions such as
customer service and availability of desirable handsets.
In economics, a network good or service [14] is a product
for which the utility that a consumer gains from the product
varies with the number of other consumers of the product
(the size of the network). This effect on utility - which is
called the network externality or the network effect - may
be direct or indirect. For example, consumers of a telephone
network, which is more valuable when the service has more
subscribers, benefit from a direct network effect. The classic
example of an indirect effect is the hardware-software model,
e.g. a consumer who purchases an Android smartphone will
benefit if other consumers also purchase Android smartphones,
because this will incentivize the development of new and
varied applications for the Android platform. The network
externality may also be negative, for example, if an Internet
service provider becomes oversubscribed, its subscribers will
suffer from the congestion externality. Network effects and the
standard models for understanding them have been empirically
validated in a variety of industries, including the markets for
mobile phones [15], fixed broadband [16], personal digital
assistants [17], DVDs [18], home video games [19], ATMs [20],
and fax machines [21].
Consider a set of consumers in a market for a good. Total
demand for the good, n, is normalized so that n = 1 when all
consumers purchase the good, and n = 0 when no consumers
purchase the good. Heterogeneous consumers are parameterized
by the “taste parameter” ω, 0 ≤ ω ≤ ωˆ. A consumer with a
high ω is willing to pay more for a high-quality good.
In the case of a non-network good, the utility of a consumer
of type ω may be modeled as u(ω, p) = ω−p, and the consumer
is indifferent between purchasing the good or not when price
p = ω. For p > ωˆ, no consumer will purchase the good
(n = 0), because it is too expensive even for consumers with
the highest value of ω. At p = 0, all of the consumers will
purchase the good (n = 1). The demand curve, which indicates
what portion of the consumers will purchase the good at a
given price, has a negative slope for most non-network goods,
because the quantity demanded n increases as the price of the
good p decreases. Conversely, to increase demand for a typical
non-network good, the producer must reduce its price.
In the case of a network good, a consumer of type ω pur-
chasing the good at price p gains utility u(ω, n, p) = ωh(n) − p,
where n is the network size, and h(n) is a network externalities
function indicating how consumer utility scales with n. For
a positive network externality, h(n) increases with n, and for
a negative network externality h(n) decreases with n. With a
positive network externality, the demand curve may have a
positive slope. Unlike a non-network good, where increasing
the price reduces the demand for the good, the value of a
network good varies with the number of consumers, so as
more units are sold, the value increases and the producer can
raise the price. For a more detailed overview, see [14].
Producers of a network good with a positive network
externality therefore prefer to increase the size of their network.
In addition to selling more units of the good, producers may
increase network size by making compatible goods [12], [13].
When two network goods are compatible, then the total network
effect for a consumer of either good is based on the sum
network size of both goods. In other words, the network
externalities function for good i is evaluated using the total
network size for all the goods: h(∑j∈I nj), where I is a set
of firms producing compatible goods and i ∈ I. Then the
utility of a consumer of type ω purchasing good i at price p
is u(ω,∑j∈I nj, p) = ωh(∑j∈I nj) − p, i ∈ I. A producer of a
network good with a positive network externality has incentives
for and against compatibility:
• Network effect: A compatible product is more valuable
to consumers, since the argument to h(·) is greater.
• Market power: Making a product compatible increases
the value of a competitors’ product and reduces the per-
ceived difference between competing products, potentially
increasing price competition and forcing prices down.
Price competition occurs when competing products are
very similar, so consumers’ purchasing decisions are made
mainly on the basis of which is cheaper.
Compatibility is often used to model a firm’s choice to use a
proprietary technical standard or a common industry standard.
For example, the developers of a word processing application
might choose to use a proprietary file format so that all
consumers who need to open these files must purchase their
software, or they might choose to use an open standard so that
their users can share the files produced with their software
with users of other word processors.
The effect of the latter issue, loss of market power, is
partially mitigated by vertical differentiation. With vertical
differentiation, a producer may choose compatibility and still
distinguish itself from competitors and reduce price competition
by improving the quality of its good in other ways (not
by increasing n). For example, consumers of Android-based
smartphones benefit from the network effects due to consumers
of all Android-compatible smartphones. However, a producer
of Android phones can distinguish itself by selling handsets
with better hardware specifications than its competitors’. With
vertical differentiation, different providers capture different
portions of the market (e.g., low end vs. high end).
In this paper, we use a model of consumer utility in a market
for network goods with vertical differentiation, described
in [22]. The willingness to pay of a consumer of type ω
for good i is ωqi + qih(∑j∈I nj), where I is a set of firms
producing compatible goods, i ∈ I, and qi is a scaling factor
that represents aspects of the good’s quality that are not a
function of the network size. Firms that produce compatible
goods can distinguish themselves from one another by choosing
different quality levels. However, a firm that produces a higher-
quality good also has higher marginal costs; the marginal
cost to the producer of producing one unit of good i is
qi , its total cost is c(qi, ni) = qini , and its profits are then
pii(qi, ni, pi) = nipi − qini .
Given this economic framework, we are interested in
modeling mmWave network service as a network good, to
better understand the conditions under which mmWave network
service providers will want to share resources, and whether or
not it is desirable for a regulator to enforce resource sharing.
To answer these questions, however, we must characterize h(n),
the function that determines the network effect. In the next
section, we describe the simulation from which we empirically
derive h(n) for mmWave and microwave small cell networks.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We describe the system model of the mmWave and mi-
crowave network simulations. The results of this simulation
will be used to parameterize the economic model for resource
sharing. Our simulation captures the following key characteris-
tics of mmWave and small cell microwave networks:
• Channel model: We use the empirically derived line
of sight (LOS), NLOS and outage probabilistic channel
models for mmWave links from [23]. For the microwave
links, we use the microcell channel model described
in [24].
• Directional transmission: We use the antenna pattern
model described in [25]. For mmWave frequencies we use
model parameters representing an 8x8 antenna array at
the base station (BS) and a 4x4 antenna array at the user
equipment (UE). For microwave frequencies, we use the
ITU model for the BS antenna [24], and an omnidirectional
UE antenna.
We consider a system with two NSPs. NSP i ∈ {1, . . . , I}
has bandwidth Wi , BSs distributed in the network area using
a homogeneous Poisson Point Process (hPPP) with intensity
λBi , and UEs whose locations are modeled by an independent
hPPP with intensity λUi .
Both BSs and UEs may use antenna arrays for directional
beamforming. We approximate the actual array patterns using
a simplified pattern as in [25], [26]. Let G(φ) denote the
simplified antenna directivity pattern depicted in Fig. 1, where
M is the main lobe power gain, m is the back lobe gain and θ
is the beamwidth of the main lobe. In general, m and M are
proportional to the number of antennas in the array and M/m
depends on the type of the array. Furthermore, θ is inversely
proportional to the number of antennas, i.e., the greater the
number of antennas, the more beam directionality. We let
GB(φ) (which is parameterized by MB, mB, and θB) be the
antenna pattern of the BS, and GU (φ) (which is parameterized
by MU , mU , and θU ) be the antenna pattern of the UE.
We model a time-slotted downlink of a cellular system. For
path loss, shadowing, and outage, line of sight (LOS), and
NLOS probability distributions, we use models adopted from
[23] and [24] for mmWave and microwave links, respectively.
We assume Rayleigh block fading. The data rate is modeled as
R = (1 − α)W log2
(
1 + β
PGU (0)GB(0)H
Nf N0W + I
)
, (1)
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Fig. 1: Simplified antenna pattern with main lobe M , back lobe
m and beamwidth θ.
where α and β are overhead and loss factors, respectively, and
are introduced to fit a specific physical layer to the Shannon
capacity curve [27]. Furthermore, P is the BS transmitting
power, and H is the channel power gain derived from the model
discussed above, incorporating the effects of fading, shadowing,
outage, and path loss. We assume perfect beam alignment
between BS and UE within a cell, therefore the antenna power
gain (link directionality) is GU (0)GB(0) = MUMB. Finally,
Nf , N0, W and I are UE noise figure, noise power spectral
density, bandwidth, and interference power, respectively.
In the mmWave scenario, each cell belonging to a given NSP
i reuses the whole bandwidth Wi available to that NSP, with
no coordination between cells. Although it is possible to have
strong interference due to the lack of coordination, the narrow
beamwidth, increased channel loss, and large bandwidth (hence
large noise power) in the mmWave scenario mean that noise
and not interference is usually the dominant effect [23]. In the
microwave scenario, where intercell interference is stronger,
we use frequency reuse as in [28]. For frequency reuse factor
δ, each cell is randomly assigned one band with bandwidth
Wi
δ from the δ bands available to each NSP.
Early work on resource sharing in mmWave networks [1]–
[3], [29] has focused on signal propagation and interference
effects in networks with shared resources. To approximate the
data rate at a UE, they divide its link capacity as determined
by SINR by the total number of UEs in the cell. In a realistic
network with opportunistic scheduling, however, a UE may
achieve a higher data rate than its average SINR would suggest,
because it is scheduled with higher priority in time slots
when its SINR is high. For an economic analysis we need to
accurately model how consumers’ utility scales with all aspects
of network size, including the number of subscribers, so our
model must include this scheduling gain. We adopt a modified
scheduler based on the multicell temporal fair opportunistic
scheduler proposed in [30]. That scheduler involves two stages:
in the first stage a UE is nominated for each cell, and then,
after some coordination among base stations, a subset of the
nominated users are scheduled in the second stage. We have
no coordination between BSs, so we use only the first (user
nomination) stage of the scheduler mentioned above. Thus
each BS runs the scheduler and selects a UE independently,
without considering intercell interference.
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Fig. 2: Effect of increasing network size on fifth percentile data
rates (used as a metric of consumer utility), with the piecewise
line estimated by an ordinary least squares linear regression.
Error bars show 95% bootstrap confidence intervals.
IV. NETWORK SIMULATION RESULTS
Using the model of Section III, we simulate mmWave and
microwave networks with the parameters given in Table I.
TABLE I: Network parameters
Parameter mmWave microwave
Frequency 73 GHz 2.5 GHz
Max. bandwidth (Wmax) 1 GHz 300 MHz
Frequency reuse factor 1 3
Max. BS density (λBmax) 100 BSs/km
2 100 BSs/km2
Max. UE density (λUmax) 500 UEs/km
2 500 UEs/km2
BS transmit power P 30 dBm 30 dBm
(MB ,mB ,θB ) (20 dB, -10 dB, 5◦) (0 dB, -20 dB, 70◦)
(MU ,mU ,θU ) (10 dB, -10 dB, 30◦) (0 dB, 0 dB, 360◦)
Simulation area 1 km2 1 km2
Rate model (α, β) (0.2, 0.5) (0.2, 0.5)
UE noise figure N f 7 dB 7 dB
Noise PSD N0 -174 dBm/Hz -174 dBm/Hz
Recall that we model mmWave network service as a network
good, as described in Section II. Subscribers benefit from
an indirect positive network externality: a large NSP with
more subscribers (higher density of UEs) will build a denser
deployment of BSs and purchase more spectrum. Thus network
size of NSP i, ni , represents the normalized demand for the
service (scaled to the range [0, 1]), but is also a scaling factor
on the BS density and bandwidth of the NSP. Specifically, as
ni varies, the UE density λUi is niλ
U
max, the BS density λ
B
i
is niλBmax, and the bandwidth Wi is niWmax. We then find the
net effect of increasing network size ni on subscribers’ fifth
percentile data rates. We use fifth percentile rates as a key
metric of utility because research on human behavior suggests
that service reliability is rated highly in perceived quality of
mobile service [31]. We take the fifth percentile rate as a proxy
for service reliability to obtain h(n), the network externalities
function introduced in Section II.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 2. We approximate
the variation of the fifth percentile rate with network size as a
linear or piecewise linear relationship, estimated by an ordinary
least squares linear regression, with breakpoints found using
the segmented package for R [32].
We note two key differences between mmWave and mi-
crowave networks. First, in microwave networks, the fifth
percentile rate increases beginning from a very small network
size. In mmWave networks, the fifth percentile rate remains flat
at first and starts increasing only at a moderate network size.
This is due to the increased path loss at mmWave frequencies,
where a denser deployment of BSs is necessary to prevent
outage. Second, we note that for moderate or large networks,
the network effect is stronger in mmWave networks, as per
the slope of the line in Fig. 2a relative to the line in Fig. 2b
(note the different vertical axis scales). This is due to the much
larger bandwidth and the greater benefit due to having a LOS
link in a mmWave network.
Fig. 2 also suggests some intuition regarding incentives for
sharing in mmWave and microwave networks. The effect of
resource sharing is similar to an increase in network size:
when two NSPs of size n1 and n2 agree to share resources,
subscribers of both NSPs experience the network effects due to
the total network size n1 + n2. Fig. 2 shows that network effect
in mmWave networks is different, and that the network size has
a greater impact on utility than in microwave networks. Thus
resource sharing may be less profitable for a dominant (large
n) mmWave service provider, because the advantage gained by
its competitor due to sharing is greater than it would be in an
equivalent microwave network scenario. In the next section, we
will examine this intuition in the context of a duopoly game.
V. DUOPOLY GAME
We model the NSPs’ decision to share network resources
or not as a compatibility problem (introduced in Section II),
where NSPs are considered compatible if their subscribers can
connect to any of the set of NSPs’ BSs, and use a bandwidth
equal to their pooled spectrum holdings. In many locations in
the United States and around the world, the market for cellular
service is effectively a duopoly. We therefore consider a market
with two vertically differentiated NSPs, and the three-stage
game with complete information described in [22]:
1) NSPs i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously choose quality qi from
[0, qˆ].
2) NSPs i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously set price pi .
3) Each consumer subscribes to one NSP i ∈ {1, 2} or neither.
The quality qi is the inherent quality (with maximum feasible
value qˆ). It refers to aspects of service unrelated to the size of
the network, such as the quality of the legacy data network,
customer service, and the availability of desirable handsets.
An NSP’s marginal costs are increasing in qi , with cost
function c(qi, ni) = qini , and so each NSP i ∈ {1, 2} seeks to
maximize its profits
pii(qi, ni, pi) = nipi − qini (2)
Consumers evaluate competing services in terms of the
difference in their inherent qualities as well as their network
externalities. We have heterogeneous consumers parameterized
by ω, with ω distributed uniformly from [0, ωˆ]. The surplus
of a consumer of type ω subscribing to NSP i is given by
u(ω, qi, n˜i, pi) = ωqi + qih(n˜) − pi (3)
with i ∈ {1, 2}, and each consumer subscribes to at most one
NSP. If the NSPs share their mmWave network resources, then
n˜i =
∑
i∈{1,2} ni , otherwise n˜i = ni .
The fifth percentile rate is linear or piecewise linear in the
network size in a mmWave (Fig. 2a) or microwave network
(Fig. 2b). We consider only moderate- to large-sized networks,
corresponding to the line on the right side of Fig. 2a. Thus the
network externalities function h(n˜i) is approximately linear in
n˜i , and we take h(n˜i) = µn˜i The scaling factor µ determines
the intensity of the network externality, and is derived from
slopes of the lines in Fig. 2 as µmm = 0.64 and µmicro = 0.05.
By their choice of quality level, the NSPs segment the
market into a low-end group (small-ω type) and a high-end
group (large-ω type). Without loss of generality, we assign
index 1 to the NSP that chooses the higher quality, i.e., q1 > q2,
and subscribers of NSP 1 belong to the large-ω group. We
define two marginal consumers: the consumer of type ω is
indifferent between choosing no subscription and subscribing
to NSP 2, and the consumer of type ω is indifferent between
subscribing to NSP 1 and subscribing to NSP 2.
Then the utility of the marginal consumer of type ω satisfies
ωq1 + µq1n˜1 − p1 = ωq2 + µq2n˜2 − p2 (4)
and the utility of the marginal consumer of type ω satisfies
ωq2 + µq2n˜2 − p2 = 0 (5)
Also, the marginal consumer of type ω defines the market
share of the high-end service
n1 =
ωˆ − ω
ωˆ
(6)
and the marginal consumers together define the market share
of the low-end service
n2 =
ω − ω
ωˆ
(7)
We can solve (4)-(7) for n1, n2, ω, and ω, and thus determine
the decisions of the consumers and the market share of each
NSP given pi, qi, i ∈ {1, 2}.
It is shown in [22] that when 0 ≤ µ < min[1, ωˆ/2] and the
ratio of quality levels satisfies
q1
q2
>
(
ωˆ2
(ωˆ − µ)(ωˆ − 2µ)
)
(8)
there is a unique Nash equilibrium with both NSPs’ prices
higher than their marginal costs. Furthermore, if (4)-(7) satisfies
0 < ω < ω < ωˆ (9)
then both NSPs have market share greater than zero. When
both (8) and (9) hold, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium
in which both NSPs earn non-zero profit. We are primarily
interested in the scenario in which both service providers offer
service at a non-zero profit, so we restrict our attention to these
circumstances.
If (8) and (9) hold and NSPs do not share resources, then
per [22] their equilibrium quality levels q∗1,NS, q
∗
2,NS are:
q∗1,NS = qˆ (10)
q∗2,NS =
qˆ(ωˆ−µ)2
[
11ωˆ−10µ−
√
3(3ωˆ2+28ωˆµ−20µ2)
]
2ωˆ2(7ωˆ−5µ) < qˆ (11)
and their equilibrium prices p∗1,NS, p
∗
2,NS are:
p∗1,NS = q1
[
1 + (ωˆ−1)[2q1(ωˆ−µ)
2−q2ωˆ(2ωˆ−µ)]
4q1(ωˆ−µ)2−q2ωˆ2
]
> q1 (12)
p∗2,NS = q2
[
1 + (ωˆ−1)[q1(ωˆ−µ)(ωˆ−2µ)−q2ωˆ
2]
4q1(ωˆ−µ)2−q2ωˆ2
]
> q2 (13)
The profits of the high-end NSP always increase with q1, so it
will use qˆ. The low-end NSP balances two competing effects:
at high values of q2 it captures more of the market, but is also
more similar to q1, which increases price competition.
The total consumer surplus is then∫ ωˆ
ω
u(ω, q∗1,NS, n1, p∗1,NS) dω +
∫ ω
ω
u(ω, q∗2,NS, n2, p∗2,NS) dω (14)
If the NSPs share resources, then per [22] their equilibrium
quality levels q∗1,S, q
∗
2,S are:
q∗1,S = qˆ (15)
q∗2,S =
qˆ(4ωˆ − 3µ)
7ωˆ − 6µ < qˆ (16)
and their equilibrium prices p∗1,S, p
∗
2,S are:
p∗1,S = q1
[
1 +
2ωˆ(ωˆ − 1)(q1 − q2)
(4ωˆ − 3µ)q1 − ωˆq2
]
> q1 (17)
p∗2,S = q2
[
1 +
ωˆ(ωˆ − 1)(q1 − q2)
(4ωˆ − 3µ)q1 − ωˆq2
]
> q2 (18)
The total consumer surplus is then∫ ωˆ
ω
u(ω, q∗1,S, n1 + n2, p∗1,S) dω +
∫ ω
ω
u(ω, q∗2,S, n1 + n2, p∗2,S) dω (19)
We are also interested in the monopoly case, for comparison.
When there is one NSP, the marginal consumer is defined by
ωq1 + µq1n˜1 − p1 = 0 (20)
and the market share of the NSP is
n1 =
ωˆ − ω
ωˆ
(21)
At equilibrium, the monopoly NSP will choose quality level
q∗1,M = qˆ (22)
and price
p∗1,M =
q1(ωˆ − 1)
2
(23)
The total consumer surplus is then∫ ωˆ
ω
u(ω, q∗1,M, n1, p∗1,M ) dω (24)
Fig. 3 shows the NSP profit (2); price (12), (13), (17),
(18), and (23); total consumer surplus (14), (19), and (24); and
market share (6), (7), and (21) in the duopoly game, for various
market parameters (ωˆ, qˆ). First, we note that our intuition of
Section IV is validated: Fig. 3a and Fig. 3e show that resource
sharing is less often profitable to both NSPs at the same time in
mmWave networks than in microwave networks. The low-end
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Fig. 3: Profit of each NSP, price set by NSP, total consumer surplus, and market share of each NSP (and total market coverage)
in the duopoly game. As ωˆ increases, the market is more easily separated into high-end and low-end groups and NSPs compete
primarily on quality, so there is less price competition. A similar effect occurs as qˆ increases. The intensity of the network
effect is µmm = 0.64 for mmWave networks and µmicro = 0.05 for microwave networks.
NSP benefits more from sharing in mmWave networks because
of the greater importance of having a large network. For the
same reason, however, the competitive advantage that comes
with not sharing for the dominant (high-end) NSP is greater
than in microwave networks. We note from Fig. 3b and Fig. 3f
that under market conditions where the high-end NSP does not
prefer sharing, it sets lower prices in the sharing scenario than
the no sharing scenario, indicating increased price competition
from the low-end NSP when sharing resources. We also note
that with sharing, some previously high-end subscribers will
subscribe to the low-end NSP (Fig. 3d and Fig. 3h).
We further find that the consumer does not necessarily enjoy
greater surplus when NSPs share resources (Fig. 3c and Fig. 3g).
This is because an NSP may raise prices (Fig. 3b and Fig. 3f),
especially when price competition is not a concern. In particular,
the low-end NSP in mmWave networks is likely to raise its
price because its service is dramatically improved by sharing.
The benefit to NSPs and consumers of resource sharing
depends on the market parameters, qˆ and ωˆ. Reducing qˆ, the
maximum possible quality level, increases price competition;
when the difference in quality levels between NSPs is small,
consumers are more sensitive to price. Similarly, reducing
the maximum value of the taste parameter, ωˆ, increases price
competition, since this decreases the dispersion of consumers’
willingness to pay and the market is less segmented. These
effects are magnified when the intensity of the network effect
is large (as it is in mmWave networks); then, the high-end
NSP prefers resource sharing only when the market is highly
segmented and there is little price competition (i.e., for large
ωˆ and qˆ).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have modeled the resource sharing decisions
of service providers in mmWave 5G cellular networks. We
have described a duopoly game involving two vertically differ-
entiated cellular service providers, and compared mmWave and
microwave networks with respect to key economic metrics.
Our results suggest that resource sharing is profitable for
both NSPs at the same time less often in mmWave networks
than in microwave networks. Because resource sharing has a
stronger impact on subscribers’ data rate in mmWave networks,
the competitive advantage held by the larger NSP due to
not sharing resources is greater and more likely to offset
the gains associated with consumers’ increased willingness
to pay for service in a network with resource sharing. We also
find that because NSPs may increase prices when they share
resources (because of subscribers’ greater willingness to pay
for a large network), resource sharing does not necessarily have
a net positive effect on consumer surplus, thus regulation that
mandates resource sharing may not always be in consumers’
best interests. However, regulators may still consider mandated
sharing under circumstances where, due to factors not captured
in this model, the low-end NSP would choose to leave the
market. In this case, mandated sharing increases the low-end
NSP’s profits and might encourage it to stay in the market,
improving consumer surplus relative to a monopoly.
We briefly discuss here some limitations of our approach. Our
model captures key factors in consumer decisions, including
the price of service, the size of the spectrum and base station re-
sources available to subscribers (incorporating both the service
provider’s resources and shared resources), and factors affecting
the perceived value of service that are not related to the network
size. Similarly, from the service providers’ perspectives, our
model includes the effects of price competition between service
providers, the dispersion in consumers’ willingness to pay for
service, and the increased cost of offering a service with a
greater inherent quality. However, our model does not directly
include the initial investment cost associated with deploying a
mmWave cellular network, such as spectrum licensing costs;
because the licensing mechanism for mmWave bands has not
yet been decided, it is difficult to model accurately at this
time. Similarly, because mmWave cellular service has not yet
been deployed in any market, we cannot use empirical data
from the mmWave cellular service market to inform or validate
our analysis. Our model uses the utility function whose form
is proposed in [22], in which the inherent quality (vertical
differentiation factor) multiplies the quality factor that is related
to network size. As a result, it may overestimate the magnitude
of the disparity between service providers’ profits and prices.
However, other models of duopoly markets with network effects
without vertical differentiation, such as [13], similarly find
that compatibility is not a consensual equilibrium when the
magnitude of the network effect is large.
As future work, we would like to explore alternative
approaches to sharing, to preserve the technical sharing gains
while also improving NSP profit and consumer surplus.
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